

MICROFILM DIVIDER

OMB/RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION

SFN 2053 (2/85) 5M



ROLL NUMBER

DESCRIPTION

2136

2007 SENATE JUDICIARY

SB 2136

2007 SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE MINUTES

Bill/Resolution No. SB 2136

Senate Judiciary Committee

☐ Check here for Conference Committee

Hearing Date: January 10, 2007

Recorder Job Number: 908

Committee Clerk Signature

Mona L. Solberg

Minutes: Relating to transfer of ownership regarding civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals to the Gronewald Middleton building on the grounds of state hospital

Senator David Nething, Chairman called the Judiciary committee to order. All Senators were present. The hearing opened with the following testimony:

Testimony In Support of Bill:

Alex C. Schweitzer, Super of ND State Hospital and Dev. Center of the Dept. of Human Services. (meter 0:01) Gave testimony – Att. #1a provided committee a map of the Jamestown ND State Hospital-Att. #1b

Sen Lyson sited his concerns in taking a person who had committed a criminal act vs a civil act and how this could have constitutional issues would arise housing them in the same location. (They can not be housed in the same place)

Sen Olafson asked for the detail on how the civil commitment process works with people in treatment (meter 10:20) These are people in and asking for treatment.

Sen. Nelson questioned what type of "stigma" will follow these people when they get out having been housed in this facility. **Mr. Schweitzer** spoke of the stigma they have regardless of where they were located and the problems they face. (meter 11:46)

Discussion was the issue is the security of the staff not the "treatment" part. Spoke of several occasions where staff were injured. We can only add security up to a certain level or we will be in violations. This facility is set up different then the hospital setting. Discussion (15:33) of how different facilities run there security. Sex offenders need to be in a maximum security and can only go to other parts of the facility under and escort. Discussed appropriation of bill.

Ryan Bernstein, Governor's Office – stated that this is not of "punitive" nature that the individuals are there, It is not punitive it is treatment based-They volunteer to be at treatment, once they are done, they leave. This is the Department of correction and REHABILITATION. There was discussion on the constitutionality of bill Att. # 2 Brief.

Sen. Lyson sited that he did not care what the Federal Constitution states he is concerned about the State Constitution.

Testimony in Opposition of the Bill:

Aaron Burst – Assoc. of Co. (meter 21:50) States Attorney's Association. Spoke of pro's and cons of bill gave no new information.

Testimony Neutral to the Bill:

None

Senator David Nething, Chairman closed the hearing requesting the Attorney Generals opinion on the state constitutional issues of this bill.

Additional Testimony Submitted

Jessica McSparron Bien, Sex. Assault Prog. & Policy Coord, ND. Council on Aboused Women's Service and Coalition. Att. #3

2007 SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE MINUTES

Bill/Resolution No. **SB 2136**

Senate Judiciary Committee

☐ Check here for Conference Committee

Hearing Date: February 7, 2007

Recorder Job Number: 3053

Committee Clerk Signature *Marie L. Solberg*

Minutes: Relating to transfer of ownership regarding civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals to the Gronewald Middleton Building on the grounds of the state hospital.

Senator David Nething, Chairman called the Judiciary committee to order. All Senators were present. The hearing opened with the following committee work:

Ryan Bernstien, Legal Council for the Governors Office Originally we came to you with 2136 and the Governor thinks this is the right plan. Spoke of safety concerns causing us to want to move to Dept. of Corrections. Spoke of committees concern of constitutional issues; we will work with you on that with the amendments – Att. #1 to work with the structure and the training of employees.

Sen. Nething stated that the amendment (meter 2:00) clarifies that the corrections has the responsibility for the property and the security of the civilly committed sex offenders and the State Hospital has the responsibility for the treatment programs. The amendment will accomplish this by agreement.

Mr. Bernstien said that after a review of the amendments we have concerns with them (meter 3:00) We could support section 3. That is the only part. Discussion of the amendments Mr. Bernstien does not think these amendments accomplish what the bill was set out to do. The committee discussed more on the “constitutional” issues and the A.G.’s office amendment Att.

#1. Why is the transferring of land so difficult? (meter 7:40) This does not help the security issues and it will cause funding and appropriation issues. If we use the dept. of corrections to help the security issues and they already have the money.

Carol Olson Dept. of Human Services (meter 8:51) I agree with Mr. Bernstiens – J.A.C.O.H.O. regulations. Due to the hospital aspect we have to fallow Federal regulations that they have. If the whole program is moved to DOCR, they would not have to follow the JACOHO regulations. This would be the primary reason to do so. If you do amendment 1 & 2 you still have to follow JACOHO requirements. There may be a conflict between the treatment staff and the security staff. Referred to the rapid growth of our state hospital. (meter 10:50) Spoke of the building being divided and how would they have growth issues and management issues. Section three is the only workable part in the amendment that we would find workable.

Sen. Nothing talked among the two (meter 14:52) of what would need to be done to make the security issues of the bill covered and how it would also not have constitutional issues.

Sen. Nothing stated that why do we even need the bill. Why do we not kill the bill and let the two departments' work it out and also spoke of the mandate part of the bill "shall" study.

Sen. Nothing will visit with the Attorney General's office with the amendments his concerns are the JACO requirements and the security issues.

Senator David Nothing, Chairman closed the hearing.

2007 SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE MINUTES

Bill/Resolution No. **SB 2136**

Senate Judiciary Committee

☐ Check here for Conference Committee

Hearing Date: February 12, 2007

Recorder Job Number: 3355

Committee Clerk Signature *Monica L. Solby*

Minutes: Relating to transfer of ownership regarding civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals to the Gornewald Middleton building on the grounds of the State Hospital.

Senator David Nething, Chairman called the Judiciary committee to order. All Senators were present. The hearing opened with the following committee work: (meter 18:21)

Sen. Nething reviewed the amendment presented to the committee – Att. #1 (meter 18:21)

Senator David Nething, Chairman closed the hearing.

Sen. Lyson made the motion to Do Pass and **Sen. Nelson** seconded the motion.

Discussion: **Sen. Fiebiger** questioned (meter 20:48) how detailed, in section 1, do we need to be in the training etcetera or is that in agreement the departments will have with each other. Yes, it will be interdepartmentally made. It was discussion of the Governors office and the Attorney Generals office on there views of the amendment.

All members were in favor and the motion passes.

Sen. Lyson made the motion to Do Pass SB 2136 as amended and **Sen. Nelson** seconded the motion. All members were in favor and the motion passes.

Carrier: **Sen. Nething**

Senator David Nething, Chairman closed the hearing.

FISCAL NOTE
Requested by Legislative Council
03/01/2007

Amendment to: Engrossed
 SB 2136

1A. State fiscal effect: *Identify the state fiscal effect and the fiscal effect on agency appropriations compared to funding levels and appropriations anticipated under current law.*

	2005-2007 Biennium		2007-2009 Biennium		2009-2011 Biennium	
	General Fund	Other Funds	General Fund	Other Funds	General Fund	Other Funds
Revenues						
Expenditures						
Appropriations						

1B. County, city, and school district fiscal effect: *Identify the fiscal effect on the appropriate political subdivision.*

2005-2007 Biennium			2007-2009 Biennium			2009-2011 Biennium		
Counties	Cities	School Districts	Counties	Cities	School Districts	Counties	Cities	School Districts

2A. Bill and fiscal impact summary: *Provide a brief summary of the measure, including description of the provisions having fiscal impact (limited to 300 characters).*

Engrossed SB2136 directs the DOCR and the DHS to enter into an interagency agreement. The agreement is to direct the DOCR to provide security and safety provisions to DHS in the operation of the of the civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals program.

B. Fiscal impact sections: *Identify and provide a brief description of the sections of the measure which have fiscal impact. Include any assumptions and comments relevant to the analysis.*

Engrossed SB2316 is estimated to have no fiscal impact.

3. State fiscal effect detail: *For information shown under state fiscal effect in 1A, please:*

A. Revenues: *Explain the revenue amounts. Provide detail, when appropriate, for each revenue type and fund affected and any amounts included in the executive budget.*

n/a

B. Expenditures: *Explain the expenditure amounts. Provide detail, when appropriate, for each agency, line item, and fund affected and the number of FTE positions affected.*

n/a

C. Appropriations: *Explain the appropriation amounts. Provide detail, when appropriate, for each agency and fund affected. Explain the relationship between the amounts shown for expenditures and appropriations. Indicate whether the appropriation is also included in the executive budget or relates to a continuing appropriation.*

07-09 executive recommendation for the operation of the civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals program is in SB2012 - Dept of Human Services appropriation bill.

Name:	Dave Krabbenhoft	Agency:	DOCR
Phone Number:	328-6135	Date Prepared:	03/01/2007

FISCAL NOTE
Requested by Legislative Council
02/14/2007

Amendment to: SB 2136

1A. State fiscal effect: *Identify the state fiscal effect and the fiscal effect on agency appropriations compared to funding levels and appropriations anticipated under current law.*

	2005-2007 Biennium		2007-2009 Biennium		2009-2011 Biennium	
	General Fund	Other Funds	General Fund	Other Funds	General Fund	Other Funds
Revenues						
Expenditures						
Appropriations						

1B. County, city, and school district fiscal effect: *Identify the fiscal effect on the appropriate political subdivision.*

2005-2007 Biennium			2007-2009 Biennium			2009-2011 Biennium		
Counties	Cities	School Districts	Counties	Cities	School Districts	Counties	Cities	School Districts

2A. Bill and fiscal impact summary: *Provide a brief summary of the measure, including description of the provisions having fiscal impact (limited to 300 characters).*

Engrossed SB2136 directs the DOCR and the DHS to enter into an interagency agreement. The agreement is to direct the DOCR to provide security and safety provisions to DHS in the operation of the of the civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals program.

B. Fiscal impact sections: *Identify and provide a brief description of the sections of the measure which have fiscal impact. Include any assumptions and comments relevant to the analysis.*

Engrossed SB2316 is estimated to have no fiscal impact.

3. State fiscal effect detail: *For information shown under state fiscal effect in 1A, please:*

A. Revenues: *Explain the revenue amounts. Provide detail, when appropriate, for each revenue type and fund affected and any amounts included in the executive budget.*

n/a

B. Expenditures: *Explain the expenditure amounts. Provide detail, when appropriate, for each agency, line item, and fund affected and the number of FTE positions affected.*

n/a

C. Appropriations: *Explain the appropriation amounts. Provide detail, when appropriate, for each agency and fund affected. Explain the relationship between the amounts shown for expenditures and appropriations. Indicate whether the appropriation is also included in the executive budget or relates to a continuing appropriation.*

07-09 executive recommendation for the operation of the civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals program is in SB2012 - Dept of Human Services appropriation bill.

Name:	Dave Krabbenhoft	Agency:	DOCR
Phone Number:	328-6135	Date Prepared:	02/21/2007

FISCAL NOTE
Requested by Legislative Council
01/02/2007

Bill/Resolution No.: SB 2136

1A. State fiscal effect: *Identify the state fiscal effect and the fiscal effect on agency appropriations compared to funding levels and appropriations anticipated under current law.*

	2005-2007 Biennium		2007-2009 Biennium		2009-2011 Biennium	
	General Fund	Other Funds	General Fund	Other Funds	General Fund	Other Funds
Revenues						
Expenditures						
Appropriations						

1B. County, city, and school district fiscal effect: *Identify the fiscal effect on the appropriate political subdivision.*

2005-2007 Biennium			2007-2009 Biennium			2009-2011 Biennium		
Counties	Cities	School Districts	Counties	Cities	School Districts	Counties	Cities	School Districts

2A. Bill and fiscal impact summary: *Provide a brief summary of the measure, including description of the provisions having fiscal impact (limited to 300 characters).*

SB2136 transfers 1)the responsibilities for the commitment of sexually dangerous individuals; 2)the Gronewald Middleton building; and 3)appropriation; from the ND Human Services to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

B. Fiscal impact sections: *Identify and provide a brief description of the sections of the measure which have fiscal impact. Include any assumptions and comments relevant to the analysis.*

SB2316 is estimated to have no fiscal impact beyond what is currently recommended in the 07-09 ND Human Services budget for the operation of the civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals program. It is anticipated, at this time, that no additional funding or positions will be necessary to complete the transfer. However if during the transition period, it is determined that the amount to be transferred (staff and/or funding)is not adequate, the DOCR will request a deficiency appropriation for the legislative assembly. The bill provides that the actual transfer of the program will take effect on the earlier of July 1, 2008 or the date on which the department of human services and the department of corrections and rehabilitation jointly certify to the legislative council that the transfer is complete.

3. State fiscal effect detail: *For information shown under state fiscal effect in 1A, please:*

A. Revenues: *Explain the revenue amounts. Provide detail, when appropriate, for each revenue type and fund affected and any amounts included in the executive budget.*

n/a

B. Expenditures: *Explain the expenditure amounts. Provide detail, when appropriate, for each agency, line item, and fund affected and the number of FTE positions affected.*

n/a

C. Appropriations: *Explain the appropriation amounts. Provide detail, when appropriate, for each agency and fund affected. Explain the relationship between the amounts shown for expenditures and appropriations. Indicate whether the appropriation is also included in the executive budget or relates to a continuing appropriation.*

07-09 executive recommendation for the operation of the civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals program is in SB2012 - Dept of Human Services appropriation bill.

Name:	Dave Krabbenhoft	Agency:	DOCR
Phone Number:	328-6135	Date Prepared:	01/08/2007

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SENATE BILL NO. 2136

Page 1, line 1, after "A BILL" replace the remainder of the bill with "for an Act to provide for the transfer of ownership of the Gronewald Middleton building on the grounds of the state hospital; to require an inter-agency agreement between the department of human services and the department of corrections and rehabilitation relating to the operation, management and security of the Gronewald Middleton Building; and to require a master security plan and report to the legislative council.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF NORTH DAKOTA:

SECTION 1. TRANSFER OF LAND AND BUILDING Ownership of the Gronewald Middleton building on the grounds of the state hospital must be transferred to the department of corrections and rehabilitation. The department of corrections and rehabilitation must first approve any current or proposed construction on the Gronewald Middleton building before the construction may commence. Any authorized construction must be paid for from any remaining moneys appropriated to the department of human services for that purpose.

SECTION 2. INTER-AGENCY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION. The executive director of the department of human services and the director of the department of corrections and rehabilitation shall enter into an inter-agency agreement effective August 1, 2007, which must provide that the department of human services shall use the Gronewald Middleton building on the grounds of the state hospital for the placement of individuals for evaluation or civil commitment and treatment under chapter 25-03.3. The inter-agency agreement must provide that the department of corrections and rehabilitation shall be responsible for the provision and enforcement of safety and security procedures for the Gronewald Middleton building, for all individuals placed at the Gronewald Middleton building for evaluation or civil commitment and treatment under chapter 25-03.3, and for all staff, visitors and volunteers on the premises of the Gronewald Middleton building. The inter-agency agreement must provide that the executive director of the department of human services shall continue to be responsible for the custody and care of the individuals placed in the Gronewald Middleton building for evaluation or civil commitment and treatment under chapter 25-03.3, including responsibility for all assessments, evaluations, and treatment required under chapter 25-03.3, the provision of all necessary staffing, including maintenance staff, and the provision of all daily care and health care.

SECTION 3. MASTER PLAN-LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORTS. The department of human services and the department of corrections and rehabilitation shall develop a master plan for the operation, management, security and construction at the Gronewald Middleton building and any other buildings on the grounds of the state hospital which may be used for the evaluation, civil commitment and treatment of

individuals under chapter 25-03.3 and shall present a report to the legislative council no later than July 1, 2008.

Renumber accordingly.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SENATE BILL NO. 2136

Page 1, line 1, after "A BILL" replace the remainder of the bill with "for an Act to provide for an agreement between the department of human services and the department of corrections and rehabilitation; and to provide for the department of human services to report to the legislative council regarding individuals committed to the department's care.


BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF NORTH DAKOTA:

SECTION 1. Interagency agreement between the department of human services and the department of corrections and rehabilitation. The executive director of the department of human services and the director of the department of corrections and rehabilitation shall enter an interagency agreement effective August 1, 2007. The agreement must provide that the department of corrections and rehabilitation is responsible for the provision and enforcement of safety and and security procedures at state-owned facilities for all individuals placed at those facilities for evaluation or civil commitment and treatment under chapter 25-03.3 and for all staff, visitors, and volunteers at those facilities. The interagency agreement must provide that the executive director of the department of human services shall continue to be responsible for the custody and care of the individuals placed at those facilities for evaluation or civil commitment and treatment under chapter 25-03.3, including responsibility for all assessments, evaluations, and treatment required under chapter 25-03.3, the provision of all necessary staffing, including maintenance staff, and the provision of all daily care and health care.

SECTION 2. REPORT TO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL. Before March first of each even-numbered year, the department of human services shall report to the legislative council on services provided by the department of corrections and rehabilitation relating to individuals at the state hospital who have been committed to the care and custody of the executive director of the department of human services."

Renumber accordingly

February 9, 2007


2-12-02

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SENATE BILL NO. 2136

Page 1, line 1, after "A BILL" replace the remainder of the bill with "for an Act to provide for an agreement between the department of human services and the department of corrections and rehabilitation; and to provide for the department of human services to report to the legislative council regarding individuals committed to the department's care.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF NORTH DAKOTA:

SECTION 1. Interagency agreement between the department of human services and the department of corrections and rehabilitation. The executive director of the department of human services and the director of the department of corrections and rehabilitation shall enter an interagency agreement effective August 1, 2007. The agreement must provide that the department of corrections and rehabilitation is responsible for the provision and enforcement of safety and security procedures at state-owned facilities for all individuals placed at those facilities for evaluation or civil commitment and treatment under chapter 25-03.3 and for all staff, visitors, and volunteers at those facilities. The interagency agreement must provide that the executive director of the department of human services shall continue to be responsible for the custody and care of the individuals placed at those facilities for evaluation or civil commitment and treatment under chapter 25-03.3, including responsibility for all assessments, evaluations, and treatment required under chapter 25-03.3, the provision of all necessary staffing, including maintenance staff, and the provision of all daily care and health care.

SECTION 2. Report to legislative council - Individuals committed to state hospital. Before March first of each even-numbered year, the department of human services shall report to the legislative council on services provided by the department of corrections and rehabilitation relating to individuals at the state hospital who have been committed to the care and custody of the executive director of the department of human services."

Renumber accordingly

Date: 2-12-07

Roll Call Vote # 1

2007 SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ROLL CALL VOTES

BILL/RESOLUTION NO. 2136

Senate _____ Judiciary _____ Committee _____

☐ Check here for Conference Committee

Legislative Council Amendment Number _____

Action Taken Do Pass Amendment Att #1 2/12

Motion Made By Sen. Lyson Seconded By Sen. Nelson

Senators	Yes	No	Senators	Yes	No
Sen. Nething	/		Sen. Fiebiger	/	
Sen. Lyson			Sen. Marcellais		
Sen. Olafson			Sen. Nelson		

Total Yes 6 No 0

Absent 0

Floor Assignment _____

If the vote is on an amendment, briefly indicate intent:

Roll Call Vote # 2

2007 SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ROLL CALL VOTES

BILL/RESOLUTION NO. 2136

Senate	Judiciary	Committee
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☐ Check here for Conference Committee

Legislative Council Amendment Number _____

Action Taken Do Pass as Amended

Motion Made By Sen. Lyson Seconded By Sen. Nelson

[illegible]

Total Yes 6 No 0

Absent 0

Floor Assignment Sen. Nothing

If the vote is on an amendment, briefly indicate intent:

REPORT OF STANDING COMMITTEE

SB 2136: Judiciary Committee (Sen. Nething, Chairman) recommends AMENDMENTS AS FOLLOWS and when so amended, recommends **DO PASS** (6 YEAS, 0 NAYS, 0 ABSENT AND NOT VOTING). SB 2136 was placed on the Sixth order on the calendar.

Page 1, line 1, after "A BILL" replace the remainder of the bill with "for an Act to provide for an agreement between the department of human services and the department of corrections and rehabilitation; and to provide for the department of human services to report to the legislative council regarding individuals committed to the department's care.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF NORTH DAKOTA:

SECTION 1. Interagency agreement between the department of human services and the department of corrections and rehabilitation. The executive director of the department of human services and the director of the department of corrections and rehabilitation shall enter an interagency agreement effective August 1, 2007. The agreement must provide that the department of corrections and rehabilitation is responsible for the provision and enforcement of safety and security procedures at state-owned facilities for all individuals placed at those facilities for evaluation or civil commitment and treatment under chapter 25-03.3 and for all staff, visitors, and volunteers at those facilities. The interagency agreement must provide that the executive director of the department of human services shall continue to be responsible for the custody and care of the individuals placed at those facilities for evaluation or civil commitment and treatment under chapter 25-03.3, including responsibility for all assessments, evaluations, and treatment required under chapter 25-03.3, the provision of all necessary staffing, including maintenance staff, and the provision of all daily care and health care.

SECTION 2. Report to legislative council - Individuals committed to state hospital. Before March first of each even-numbered year, the department of human services shall report to the legislative council on services provided by the department of corrections and rehabilitation relating to individuals at the state hospital who have been committed to the care and custody of the executive director of the department of human services."

Renumber accordingly

2007 HOUSE HUMAN SERVICES

SB 2136

2007 HOUSE STANDING COMMITTEE MINUTES

Bill/Resolution No. SB 2136

House Human Services Committee

☐ Check here for Conference Committee

Hearing Date: February 27, 2007

Recorder Job Number: 3956

Committee Clerk Signature

Judy Schock

Minutes:

Chairman Price: We will open the hearing on SB 2136.

Ryan Bernstein, legal council for the Governor: I am here to explain the bill and offer an amendment. See attached testimony with proposed amendments.

Representative Schneider: What were some of the constitutional concerns of the Senate Judiciary committee?

Mr. Bernstein: My understanding was it is a complete transfer of the local committee programs to the Department of Corrections verses the Department of Human Services.

Representative Weisz: the constitutional issue from your perspective will there be issues of transfer?

Tom Trenbeath, Attorney General's Office: The flags that went out most of out attorneys had to do a double jeopardy situation. We removed from writing Human Services to (couldn't understand) Also the packet which has to do with punishing people who committed crimes that were not crimes at that time. I have not seen the proposed amendments.

Representative Potter: Can you give me an example of an individual that might fit into something on this order?

Mr. Trenbeath: This has to do with the violent sexual predator, where the person has completed incarcerated for the criminal sentence, but it is felt through another part of the law that he is a person in need of further treatment, than he is committed to civil. He could be a danger to himself as well as others.

Representative Conrad: How many people for the record are in treatment? How many have you brought in, in the last year?

Alex Schweitzer, superintendent of ND State Hospital: Currently we have 40 committed, 16 recommended for commitment and an additional 3 in evaluation. It has grown rapidly during the last 3 years. We are projecting on this year's budget to grow from 62 beds to 82 beds.

Chairman Price: anyone else in favor of SB 2136? Any opposition to the bill? Hearing none we will close the hearing on SB 2136

2007 HOUSE STANDING COMMITTEE MINUTES

Bill/Resolution No. SB 2136

House Human Services Committee

☐ Check here for Conference Committee

Hearing Date: February 27, 2007

Recorder Job Number: 4016

Committee Clerk Signature

Judy Lebeck

Minutes:

Chairman Price: Take out SB 2136 for discussion. Trendbeck and Bernstein were going to look at amendments, right? Is there anything else the committee needs?

Representative Weisz: I don't really see there is anything in the language that would cause (could not understand) I see it making even less of a concern because you are deleting the must provide part. You took out the language of providing and said you're going to train staff.

I move the amendments, seconded by Representative Hatlestad. A vocal role was taken with 11 yeas, 0 nays, and 1 absent.

The committee had discussion on what happens with people when they are released from incarceration, and Human Services is not necessarily aware they were released.

Representative Hofstad moves a do pass as amended, seconded by **Representative Hatlestad**.

Representative Conrad: I would like to see an interim study connected with this issue

Representative Weisz: this bill, from what i gather from the testimony were about some issues having to do with safety and security of the personal so put it into the department of corrections because they may be more able to deal with those issues. It really isn't about the

Page 2

House Human Services Committee

Bill/Resolution No. SB 2136

Hearing Date: February 27, 2007

whole process of civil commitment it is merely to address a problematic issue of DHS being uncomfortable.

The role was taken with 11 yeas, 0 nays, 1 absent. **Representative Conrad** will carry the bill to the floor.

78108.0201
Title.0300

Adopted by the Human Services Committee
February 27, 2007

**House Amendments to Engrossed SB 2136 (78108.0201) - Human Services Committee
02/27/2007**

Page 1, line 10, replace "is responsible for" with "shall train, consult, and assist the department
of human services with"

Renumber accordingly

Date: 2/27
Roll Call Vote #: 1

2007 HOUSE STANDING COMMITTEE ROLL CALL VOTES
BILL/RESOLUTION NO. "Click here to type Bill/Resolution No."

House HUMAN SERVICES

SB 2136

Committee

☐ Check here for Conference Committee

Legislative Council Amendment Number _____

Action Taken

Moves Amendment

Motion Made By

Rep.

Wu

Seconded By

Rep.

Hallestad

Representatives	Yes	No	Representatives	Yes	No
Clara Sue Price – Chairman			Kari L Conrad		
Vonnie Pietsch – Vice Chairman			Lee Kaldor		
Chuck Damschen			Louise Potter		
Patrick R. Hatlestad			Jasper Schneider		
Curt Hofstad					
Todd Porter					
Gerry Uglem					
Robin Weisz					

Total (Yes) 11 "Click here to type Yes Vote" No 0 "Click here to type No Vote"

Absent 1

Floor Assignment

Rep. _____

If the vote is on an amendment, briefly indicate intent:

Date: 2/27
Roll Call Vote #: 2

2007 HOUSE STANDING COMMITTEE ROLL CALL VOTES
BILL/RESOLUTION NO. "Click here to type Bill/Resolution No."

House HUMAN SERVICES

SB 2136

Committee

☐ Check here for Conference Committee

Legislative Council Amendment Number _____

Action Taken Move to pass as Amended

Motion Made By Rep. Hofstad Seconded By Rep. Hofstad

Representatives			Representatives		
	Yes	No		Yes	No
Clara Sue Price – Chairman	☒		Kari L Conrad	☒	
Vonnie Pietsch – Vice Chairman	☒		Lee Kaldor	☒	
Chuck Damschen	☒		Louise Potter	☒	
Patrick R. Hatlestad	☒		Jasper Schneider	☒	
Curt Hofstad	☒				
Todd Porter					
Gerry Uglem	☒				
Robin Weisz	☒				

Total (Yes) 11 "Click here to type Yes Vote" No 0 "Click here to type No Vote"

Absent 1

Floor Assignment Rep. Conrad

If the vote is on an amendment, briefly indicate intent:

REPORT OF STANDING COMMITTEE

SB 2136, as engrossed: Human Services Committee (Rep. Price, Chairman) recommends **AMENDMENTS AS FOLLOWS** and when so amended, recommends **DO PASS** (11 YEAS, 0 NAYS, 1 ABSENT AND NOT VOTING). Engrossed SB 2136 was placed on the Sixth order on the calendar.

Page 1, line 10, replace "is responsible for" with "shall train, consult, and assist the department of human services with"

Renumber accordingly

2007 TESTIMONY

SB 2136

Att # 1a
1-10-06

Senate Bill 2136 – Department of Human Services

Senate Judiciary Committee

Senator Nething, Chairman

January 10, 2007

Chairman Nething, members of the Judiciary Committee, I am Alex C. Schweitzer, Superintendent of the North Dakota State Hospital and Developmental Center of the Department of Human Services. I am here today to provide you with testimony in support of Senate Bill 2136.

Senate Bill 2136 amends sections of the North Dakota Century Code to allow for the transfer of responsibilities of the civil commitment program for sexually dangerous individuals from the Department of Human Services to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and to provide for the transfer of ownership of the Gronewald Middleton Building on the grounds of the State Hospital from the Department of Human Services to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The bill provides for an appropriation and for an effective date.

The Department of Human Services established the program for the treatment of sexually dangerous individuals on the grounds of the State Hospital in the fall of 1997, as a result of legislation passed in the 1997 legislature allowing for the civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals. The census in the program started at two patients in 1997 and slowly grew to 15 patients in 2003.

From 2004 through December of 2006, the program census grew to 58 patients.

The Department of Human Services supports the transfer of responsibility of this program to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for several reasons:

- The State Hospital was never intended/designed to serve a population such as civilly committed sexually dangerous individuals.
- The Correctional system has the knowledge and skills to handle the high intensity behavioral issues seen in the civilly committed sexually dangerous individuals population.
- The State Hospital is a health care facility and strives to comply with the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospital Organization (JCAHO) standards.
 - It is difficult to meet JCAHO standards while serving civilly committed sexually dangerous individuals. Much of this has to do with facility standards. A health care setting is inconsistent with the requirements of a secure unit.
 - State Hospital employees are health care workers and focus on clinical and therapy services for individuals with serious and persistent mental illness.

- Sexually dangerous individuals admitted to this program require heightened security and safety measures.
- The State Hospital has experienced two major incidents since August of 2005 in the civilly committed sexually dangerous individuals program.
 - March 30, 2006: A State Hospital employee was seriously injured while transporting a sexually dangerous individual back to the secure unit after an appointment in another building on the hospital grounds.
 - August 2005: Elopement of a sexually dangerous individual from the hospital's secure services unit.
 - In addition, the hospital is experiencing a rash of minor assaults and behaviors from sexually dangerous individuals toward other offenders and staff.

The State Hospital has responded to these incidents with the implementation of risk reduction strategies, the hiring of a security manager and safety/security upgrades.

The State Hospital management staff has completed research on how other states handle the management and responsibility of civilly committed sexually dangerous individuals. The recommended change in North Dakota is not without precedent.

The State of Massachusetts and the State of Illinois have civil commitment programs for sexually dangerous individuals managed by their correctional systems. The experience of these two states in the management of high intensity sexually dangerous individuals has been very successful. These states have the necessary security measures in place to manage the high intensity sexually dangerous individual and provide the required treatment.

Senate Bill 2136 allows for the transfer of any remaining monies from the Department of Human Services for the operation of the civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals program, including the remaining funding for 73.5 full time equivalents, to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The transfer of money will occur when the Department of Human Services transfers the program to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The bill also allows the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to request a deficiency appropriation from the legislative assembly to cover any funding shortage from the operation of the program.


This Act allows for the transfer to become effective by July 1, 2008, or the date on which the Department of Human Services and the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation certify to the legislative council that the transfer of the civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals program, facility, staff, and appropriation are ready for transition.

The Department of Human Services, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the Office of Management and Budget staff will meet as a transition committee to complete the requirements of this Act if this legislation is passed.

I would be glad to answer any questions.

AH #10
 1-10-06

- | BUILDING | NUMBER | ADDRESS |
|---------------------------------|--------|------------|
| SUPERINTENDENT COTTAGE | 2212 | CIRCLE DR |
| COTTAGE 76 | 2208 | CIRCLE DR |
| Hilltop Day C.R.C. | 2315 | CIRCLE DR |
| ALL FAITH CHAPEL | 2317 | CIRCLE DR |
| POWER HOUSE | 2318 | CIRCLE DR |
| SEWAGE LIFT STATION | 2320 | CIRCLE DR |
| WATER TANK | 2322 | CIRCLE DR |
| COTTAGE 86 | 2326 | CIRCLE DR |
| MOTOR VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP | 2328 | CIRCLE DR |
| METAL QUONSET | 2330 | CIRCLE DR |
| GRONWALD MIDDLETON | 2403 | CIRCLE DR |
| Tompkins Building | 2404 | CIRCLE DR |
| LAUNDRY | 2411 | CIRCLE DR |
| CENTRAL DINING/OFFICES | 2413 | CIRCLE DR |
| SWIMMING POOL | 2415 | CIRCLE DR |
| GENERAL KITCHEN | 2417 | CIRCLE DR |
| EMPLOYEES BUILDING | 2425 | CIRCLE DR |
| WAREHOUSE | 2428 | CIRCLE DR |
| WATER PLANT | 2438 | CIRCLE DR |
| A.S.U. Hall 2439-S | 2501 | CIRCLE DR |
| LEARNING RESOURCE CENTER | 2509 | CIRCLE DR |
| 16 WEST | 2511 | CIRCLE DR |
| CENTRAL STORES | 2517 | CIRCLE DR |
| J.R.C.C. Administration | 2519 | CIRCLE DR |
| JAMES RIVER CORRECTIONAL CENTER | 2521 | CIRCLE DR |
| 16 EAST | 2523 | CIRCLE DR |
| ENGINEERING WAREHOUSE | 2530 | CIRCLE DR |
| IMPLEMENT SHED 1 | 2532 | CIRCLE DR |
| FOUNDATIONS MAINTENANCE | 2534 | CIRCLE DR |
| IMPLEMENT SHED 2 | 2536 | CIRCLE DR |
| LAHAUG BUILDING | 2538 | CIRCLE DR |
| ELECTRIC POWER SUBSTATION | 2708 | CIRCLE DR |
| COTTAGE 77-1 | 2205 | COTTAGE LN |
| COTTAGE 77-2 | 2206 | COTTAGE LN |
| COTTAGE 77-3 | 2207 | COTTAGE LN |
| COTTAGE 77-5 | 2208 | COTTAGE LN |
| COTTAGE 78 | 2209 | COTTAGE LN |
| DOUBLE GARAGE | 2211 | COTTAGE LN |
| NO ADDRESS | | |



NORTH DAKOTA STATE
 HOSPITAL
 JAMESTOWN, NORTH DAKOTA

AH #2

1-10-07

 West Reporter Image (PDF)

149 F.3d 9

Briefs and Other Related Documents

United States Court of Appeals,
First Circuit.

Mitchell G. KING, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.

Milton GREENBLATT, M.D., Commission of the Department of Mental Health for the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

Class of 48 + 1 and Donald Pearson, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants.

Harold G. WILLIAMS, M.D., Commission of the Department of Mental Health for the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, et al. Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

Michael LESIAK, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

Norman Knight, Plaintiff, Appellant.

Harold G. WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

Michael LESIAK, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

Sherman Miller, Patton Flannery, David M. Martel, Edward Nadeau, Michael Woodward, Edward

Gallagher, James Leblanc and Philip Pizzo, Appellants.

Mitchell G. KING, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

Milton GREENBLATT, M.D., Commission of the Department of Mental Health for the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

Class of 48 + 1 and Donald Pearson, et al. and Sherman Miller, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants.

Harold G. WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

Michael LESIAK, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

Sherman Miller, David M. Martel, Edward Nadeau, Michael Woodward, Edward Gallagher and James
Leblanc, Appellants.

Nos. 95-1812, 97-1278, 95-1813, 96-1649, 97-1021 and 97-1057.

Heard Sept. 8, 1997.

Decided July 7, 1998.

Treatment center for sexually dangerous persons moved to modify three consent decree entered in institutional reform litigation, based upon enactment of statute shifting jurisdiction over center from Massachusetts Department of Mental Health (DMH) to Massachusetts Department of Corrections (DOC). Upon remand, 52 F.3d 1, the District Court modified all decrees. Appeal was taken, and the Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 190, remanded with respect to two original and supplemental decrees. On remand, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, A. David Mazzone, Senior District Judge, granted modifications to decrees. Appeal was taken, and the Court of Appeals, Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, held that: (1) district court's denial of discovery or evidentiary hearing was within its discretion; (2) 15-month delay in appointing counsel for residents was permissible; and (3) modifications to decrees were suitably tailored to changes in circumstances, including enactment of statute and significant change in philosophical approach to treatment of offenders. Affirmed.

West Headnotes

 [1] KeyCite Notes 170A Federal Civil Procedure 170AX Depositions and Discovery

- ◊ 170AX(A) In General
- ◊ 170Ak1267 Discretion of Court
- ◊ 170Ak1267.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Trial court is vested with broad discretion in granting or denying discovery.

[2] KeyCite Notes



- ◊ 170B Federal Courts
- ◊ 170BVIII Courts of Appeals
- ◊ 170BVIII(L) Determination and Disposition of Cause
- ◊ 170Bk951 Powers, Duties and Proceedings of Lower Court After Remand
- ◊ 170Bk951.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

District court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery or evidentiary hearing in connection with matter that had been remanded for determination whether modifications to consent decree governing operation of facility housing civilly committed sexually dangerous persons were warranted, in which relevant inquiry was whether Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC), which had been given authority to operate facility under state law, was likely to manage facility without violating substantive provisions of decree.

[3] KeyCite Notes



- ◊ 170A Federal Civil Procedure
- ◊ 170AX Depositions and Discovery
- ◊ 170AX(A) In General
- ◊ 170Ak1267 Discretion of Court
- ◊ 170Ak1267.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

It does not follow from the fact that judge allowed discovery and an evidentiary hearing in one case that a denial of discovery in a different case is an abuse of discretion.

[4] KeyCite Notes



- ◊ 170A Federal Civil Procedure
- ◊ 170AXV Trial
- ◊ 170AXV(A) In General
- ◊ 170Ak1951 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

In civil case, there is no constitutional right to counsel, and statutory authority of court to appoint counsel is discretionary. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915.

[5] KeyCite Notes



- ◊ 170B Federal Courts
- ◊ 170BVIII Courts of Appeals
- ◊ 170BVIII(K) Scope, Standards, and Extent
- ◊ 170BVIII(K)6 Harmless Error
- ◊ 170Bk893 k. Particular Errors as Harmless or Prejudicial. Most Cited Cases

Reviewing court may find refusal of district court to appoint counsel for pro se plaintiffs to be

reversible error only if exceptional circumstances were present such that denial of counsel was likely to result in fundamental unfairness impinging on plaintiffs' due process rights. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915.



[6] KeyCite Notes

◀ 170A Federal Civil Procedure

◀ 170AXV Trial

◀ 170AXV(A) In General

◀ 170Ak1951 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Fifteen-month delay by district court in appointing counsel for residents of facility for treatment of sexually dangerous persons, in connection with motion seeking modification of consent decrees which governed operation of facility, was not an abuse of discretion; residents were aware of period during which they were not represented, and any lack of representation was without practical effect. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915.



[7] KeyCite Notes

◀ 170A Federal Civil Procedure

◀ 170AXVII Judgment

◀ 170AXVII(A) In General

◀ 170Ak2397 On Consent

◀ 170Ak2397.4 k. Amending, Opening, or Vacating. Most Cited Cases

For modification of consent decree as result of change of circumstances to be permissible, decree must be changed no more than necessary to resolve problems created by change of circumstances, and proposed modifications must not defeat core purpose of consent decree or create a constitutional violation.



[8] KeyCite Notes

◀ 170A Federal Civil Procedure

◀ 170AXVII Judgment

◀ 170AXVII(A) In General

◀ 170Ak2397 On Consent

◀ 170Ak2397.4 k. Amending, Opening, or Vacating. Most Cited Cases

Modifications to consent decree governing operation of facility for treatment of civilly committed sexually dangerous persons were suitably tailored to changes effected by enactment of statute transferring all authority over facility to Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC), which had previously shared authority with Massachusetts Department of Mental Health (MDH), and did not defeat core purpose of consent decree or create due process violation; new plan, which added emphasis on security and safety and new approach to behavior management, was permissible and provided adequate assurances of treatment and other safeguards. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.



[9] KeyCite Notes

◀ 170A Federal Civil Procedure

◀ 170AXVII Judgment

◀ 170AXVII(A) In General

170Ak2397 On Consent

170Ak2397.4 k. Amending, Opening, or Vacating. Most Cited Cases

Enactment of statute transferring all authority over facility for treatment of civilly committed sexually dangerous persons to Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC), which had previously shared authority with Massachusetts Department of Mental Health (MDH), and significant change in philosophical approach to treatment of offenders to more restrictive behavior control approach, warranted modifications of supplemental consent decree governing facility, which would strike general proscription of disciplinary and punishment procedures, and link solitary confinement to offense underlying the original commitment of individual; modifications of decree to allow utilization of sequestration were suitably tailored to chance of circumstances, and were therefore justified.

*11 Anthony A. Scibelli with whom Robert D. Keefe, David R. Geiger, Jeffrey S. Follett, Charles Donelan, and Jonathan I. Handler were on brief for appellants Class of 48 + 1 and Donald Pearson and Sherman Miller, et al.

Jeffrey S. Follett with whom David R. Geiger was on brief for appellants Pearson, et al.

Charles Donelan for appellants Sherman Miller, et al.

William L. Pardee, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Leo Sorokin, Assistant Attorney General, were on brief for appellees.

James R. Pingeon and Beth Eisenberg on brief for the Center for Public Representation, amicus curiae.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, COFFIN and CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judges.

COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.

This opinion is a continuation of *King v. Greenblatt* ("King II"), 127 F.3d 190 (1st Cir.1997), which is the latest judicial discussion in a group of cases dating back to 1972, concerning a resident population of civilly committed sexually dangerous persons in the Treatment Center at the Massachusetts Correctional Institute in Bridgewater, Massachusetts (Center). A reference to prior cases is contained in the opinion just cited. Our present review concerns the proposed modifications, granted by the district court, of two longstanding consent decrees, the Original Decree and the Supplemental Decree.

The Original Decree had provided that the Center would be treated as a facility of the Department of Mental Health (DMH), with primary authority to be exercised by DMH and custodial personnel to be controlled by the Department of Correction (DOC). Patients were to have "the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purpose of commitment." Both DMH and DOC were to "take steps jointly" to improve physical conditions, carry out a meaningful work program, and have "a system of differing security for different categories of patients" to permit less restrictive conditions for those patients not requiring maximum security.

In an earlier opinion we considered challenges to proposed modifications of that decree. See *King v. Greenblatt* ("King I"), 52 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1995). We addressed the *12 significance of the recently enacted 1993 Mass Acts. ch. 489, which gave DOC exclusive jurisdiction of the care, treatment, rehabilitation and an added statutory goal-custody of civilly committed sexually dangerous persons in the Center. We held that this statute met the first prong of *Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail*, 502 U.S. 367, 384, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (i.e., it was a significant change of law impacting an existing consent decree, warranting modification of such decree), but remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the proposed modifications met the second *Rufo* prong, *id.* (i.e., whether the modifications were "suitably tailored" to the new law). See *King I*, 52 F.3d at 7.

Upon remand, the district court found that the proposed modifications to the Original Decree were "suitably tailored" to the new law; the court also determined that the proposed modifications to the Supplemental Decree met both prongs of *Rufo* as they were "sufficiently related" to the change in state law and "suitably tailored." The case was then appealed to us. We remanded it to the district court to address only issues relevant to the Supplemental Decree, and reserved our "suitable tailoring" review and all other issues relating to the Original Decree.

We recognized that the proposed modifications in the Supplemental Decree went beyond a transfer of

exclusive authority to DOC and would effect substantive changes in disciplinary policies, allowing the imposition of sequestration for punishment purposes (except for acts underlying commitment) and deleting a ban on all discipline and punitive procedures in the treatment of inmates civilly committed. See *King II*, 127 F.3d at 195. We opined that the link between a change in administration and sequestration policy was too tenuous, at least without further development. *Id.* We also held that neither Chapter 489, "at least without further explanation," nor our speculation, standing alone, that the Massachusetts legislature had apparently accepted a preference for behavior modification over mental health treatment would constitute a "significant change in law" affecting sequestration policy. *Id.*

We therefore sent back the proposed modifications of the Supplemental Decree to the district court for further consideration, leaving it to the court to decide whether additional factual or opinion evidence was needed. The court has since complied with our directive and, after hearing and submissions, has determined both that the change in control managed by Chapter 489 is a significant change in the law affecting the Supplemental Decree and that the modifications were suitably tailored. We now address this determination and all outstanding issues relating to both decrees.

This litigation, now in its twenty-seventh year, involving half a dozen district judges, magistrate judges, and many conferences, hearings briefings, and appeals, has accomplished much in a troubled and complex field of custody and treatment of institutionalized sexually dangerous persons. During this period, changes have occurred in conditions of confinement and treatment, in the problems confronted, and in the institutional setting. After exhaustive briefings and argument from capable counsel, we conclude that the district court acted sensitively and appropriately in conducting the proceedings below, upholding the proposed modifications of both the Original Decree and the Supplemental Decree, and signaling its readiness to exercise its oversight when occasion warrants. While we cannot expect "closure" of tensions and problems, we may hope for problems of smaller dimension capable of systematic resolution without the necessity of heroic effort.

We first address several issues relating to the Original Decree.

I. The Original Decree.

A. Denial of Discovery and Evidentiary Hearing.

Plaintiffs repeatedly requested the opportunity to engage in discovery and an evidentiary hearing. They sought to discern whether DOC intended to provide "meaningful treatment under the Plan" and whether its treatment plan was consistent with the "least restrictive conditions" requirement of the Original Decree. Plaintiffs proposed accomplishing this by exploring DOC's past *13 behavior, present behavior, and expressions of future intent. Plaintiffs' proposal contemplates interviews with all residents, examination of new procedures, expert testimony interpreting the Plan, investigation of current practices, inquiry into internal memos relating to the Plan and the persons instrumental in formulating it, and depositions of DOC officials and Joint Resource Institute (JRI) personnel responsible for treatment. As much as six months of time would be needed.

The basic response of the court in denying discovery requests was:

It may be that the plan won't work, but the Court of Appeals ... [told me not to] prejudge the plan, but they told me ... I should have a hearing, inquire into the DOC plan, giving significant weight to the local government.

* * * * *

... [W]hat would DOC do under this plan? And then I should use my judicial oversight, primarily rely on my judicial oversight, to insure that the DOC is complying with the decrees. So it seems to me that that's a very clear blueprint.

[1]  This was an accurate precis of our directives "to give significant weight to the views of local government officials" and to "rely primarily on its jurisdictional oversight to ensure DOC's compliance with the decrees." *King I*, 52 F.3d at 7. Moreover, even absent these directives, a trial court is vested with broad discretion in granting or denying discovery. 8 Charles A. Wright et al., *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 2006, at 91 (1994).

[2]  The task of the district court, following our directives, was to determine whether DOC, which had been given authority under state law, was likely to manage the Center without doing violence to the substantive portions of the Original Decree. In the words of the Special Master appointed by the court, the inquiry being undertaken was "whether DOC is approaching the control of the institution with a treatment modality."

[3]  In support of its proposal for extensive discovery and hearing, plaintiffs relied principally on the extensive procedure which the trial judge adopted on remand in *Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo*, 844 F.Supp. 31 (D.Mass.1994). But it does not follow from the fact that a judge allowed discovery and evidentiary hearing in one case that a denial of discovery in a different case is an abuse of discretion.

Appellants' basic interest in discovery was to elicit views and evidence of DOC's sincerity. To test the viability of this goal in the particular posture in which the district court found itself, we venture the following scenario. Assume that a number of witnesses testified in deposition or at a hearing that DOC officials were insincere and had no intention of carrying out the Plan as written. If the court found the witnesses credible, would it then deny DOC's request to modify? The consequence would be that the Center would then revert to the earlier dual management, despite the passage of Chapter 489. Or, would the court craft, as amicus argued, its own solution, substituting the Clinical Director for DOC, creating the bizarre situation of an employee of an entity under contract with DOC holding powers denied to DOC? In either case DOC would have no future opportunity to demonstrate its fitness to manage.

It seems clear to us that had the court pursued either course, it would not have accorded "significant weight to the views of local government officials." Indeed, it would have rejected them in their entirety on the ground of insincerity. This would violate not only our guidance but that of the Supreme Court in *Rufo*, 502 U.S. at 392 n. 14, 112 S.Ct. 748. It would also violate our directive to rely primarily on continuing oversight.

We think it therefore reasonable, at the proposed modifications stage, that the district court declined to allow an extensive investigation as to whether DOC was acting in good faith. We are not saying that the court would have abused its discretion had it chosen to allow some kind of discovery and evidentiary hearing, but certainly it did not abuse its broad discretion in denying such.

B. Delayed Appointment of Counsel.

Among the interests represented in the cluster of lawsuits now collected under the *King v. Greenblatt* tent are those raised in *14 *Williams v. Lesiak*, 822 F.2d 1223 (1st Cir.1987). In that case, the plaintiffs had focused on treatment issues at the Center, particularly the absence or inferior quality of work, job training, and educational programs. On May 27, 1994, the district court reopened *Williams* and consolidated it with *King*. Although the remaining *Williams* plaintiffs requested counsel on a number of occasions, counsel was not appointed for them until August 17, 1995. This delay, they contend, constituted an abuse of discretion and is reason for reversal.

[4] [5] Here again the review threshold is high. This being a civil case, there is no constitutional right to counsel and the statutory authority, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, is discretionary. See *Cookish v. Cunningham*, 787 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1986). Moreover, we may find reversible error only if "exceptional circumstances were present such that a denial of counsel was likely to result in fundamental unfairness impinging on [plaintiffs'] due process rights." *DesRosiers v. Moran*, 949 F.2d 15, 23 (1st Cir.1991).

[6] Our review of the evaluation of this complex and multi-faceted litigation during the fifteen months of delay reveals court actions which manifested a sensitivity to the interests of *Williams* plaintiffs and a total absence of recognizable unfairness. The first stage during this period began on May 27, 1994, with the reopening of *Williams* and the court's denial of the Commonwealth's motion to modify the Original Decree. At this time the court, having recently appointed counsel for a different group of patients intervening in *King*, the "Class of 48 + 1," expressed the hope that such counsel would "look at the global picture." The court also indicated that it might look for another person who would represent only the *Williams* plaintiffs. In December 1994, appointed counsel for the "Class of 48 + 1" plaintiffs informed a *Williams* party that he was not representing his interests. From this time, therefore, until August 17, 1995, the *Williams* plaintiffs knew they were unrepresented.

Any lack of representation during this period, however, was without any practical effect. As the district court denied the Commonwealth's motion to modify at the hearing on May 27, 1994, the *Williams* plaintiffs suffered no disadvantage at that time. We did not issue an opinion on the Commonwealth's appeal of that denial until April 6, 1995. The appeal concentrated on the significance of the enactment of Chapter 489, and did not raise any *Williams* issue. Our opinion, after holding that the statute had indeed constituted a significant change of law, meeting *Rufo*'s first prong, simply remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the second *Rufo* prong had been met. Again, there was no opportunity for harm to the *Williams* plaintiffs' interests in the appeal. In the interim period between the denial of the motion to modify and our decision on the appeal, DOC submitted its Management Plan for the Administration of the Treatment Center (Plan), views were exchanged between a Special Master and DOC, and settlement discussions took place. These discussions generally resulted in an impasse. Moreover, during much of this time, the interests of all residents were identical, since the original motion to modify sought only a change in administrative control.

In May 1995, the court denied discovery, see *supra*, resolving to confine its efforts to a close scrutiny of the Plan itself. Thus, neither side was allowed to investigate or receive additional documentation on or deposition of the other. And although on November 11, 1994, the Commonwealth filed a renewed motion to modify, seeking a change in the Supplemental Decree, no action was taken by the district court until June 29, 1995. At that time, the district court granted the renewed motion, but it also stayed four important parts of the Plan, including the Community Access Plan (CAP), involving issues prominent in *Williams*. Six weeks later, on August 17, 1995-before any action was taken on the stayed provisions of the Plan, or on any other area concerning which the *Williams* plaintiffs had expressed concern-counsel was appointed.

On this record, not only have counsel been unable to point to any prejudice stemming from the delay in appointing counsel for the *Williams* plaintiffs, but we see no possibility, as the case progressed through its various *15 stages, of any prejudice or "fundamental unfairness." We are satisfied that their interests were adequately protected by the appointment of counsel in August 1995.

C. "Suitable Tailoring" of Modifications.

[7] The second prong of *Rufo* requires that a consent decree be changed no more than necessary to resolve the problems created by the change of circumstances. The proposed modifications must not defeat the core purpose of the consent decree nor, of course, create a constitutional violation. See

Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391-92.



[8] Superficially, one might say that the changed circumstance is simply the vesting of all authority over the Center in DOC and that the proposed modifications for the Original Decree merely parrot Chapter 489 by substituting DOC for joint mention of DOC and DMH. Such a literal approach, however, obscures the reality that the Massachusetts legislature, in vesting unitary control in DOC, was also recognizing that DOC's views of the policies best suited to balance the two objectives of the Center-effective treatment of the sexually dangerous persons and the security and safety of the patient/inmate and the population as a whole-differed from those which had guided DMH during much of the previous quarter of a century. Legislative emphasis on the goal of security and safety is evidenced by the addition of "custody" in the Chapter 489 amendment to the previous formulation of goals in Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 123A § 2 of "care, treatment and rehabilitation." Accordingly, the change in control contemplated change in operations and embraced the grant of some degree of flexibility and initiative to DOC.

Similarly, the proposed modifications cannot be limited to the simple change in authority, since, as we have just noted, that change is inevitably overlaid with some expectation of change in some policies and practices. This does not mean that DOC has carte blanche to do anything it wishes, for the Original Decree remains unmodified in its requirement that "patients at the Treatment Center should have the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of commitment."

This provision is the substantive essence of the Original Decree. The decree does not embrace all the policies and practices that have been relied on in the past by DMH to achieve effective treatment under the least restrictive conditions. By the same token, as the district court realized, the "proposed modifications" are not the host of provisions in the 138-page Plan, which simply sets forth ways in which DOC aspires to fulfill the requirements of the Original Decree.

The task of conducting a "suitable tailoring" analysis therefore requires trying to determine if the basic thrust of the new authority is likely to violate "least restrictive conditions" or constitutional requirements. While the Commonwealth has the burden to demonstrate "suitable tailoring," we have also instructed the district court, as we have noted, to give significant weight to the views of local officials and to rely "primarily" on continuing judicial oversight to rectify violations. *King I*, 52 F.3d at 7. Accordingly, unless a demonstrably inadequate or erroneous policy undercutting the Original Decree appears from an anticipatory scrutiny of the Plan, DOC should be allowed to proceed.

The district court had before it not only the Plan but two volumes of appendices, exhibits, and affidavits, comments from the plaintiffs and the Special Master, and responses by DOC. The Plan has seven sections: (1) management and staffing; (2) clinical treatment program; (3) educational and vocational treatment; (4) behavior management; (5) resident management and operations; (6) CAP; and (7) integration of the Center with the prison program for sex offenders. The district court reviewed in some detail behavior management provisions (specifically, the Behavior Review Committee, the Minimum Privilege Unit, and Transfer Board policies), CAP, and resident management and operations (specifically, the restriction of privileges).

The court found that the Plan was "a permissible and detailed proposal" addressing both the increased emphasis on security and treatment concerns. With respect to security, the court stated, "security concerns in the Treatment Center have always been *16 viewed as legitimate." As to treatment, the court took note of the fact that treatment was to be provided by JRI, which had been under contract with DMH since 1992, and that its employee, Dr. Barbara Schwartz, the Center's Treatment Director, affirmed that DOC would retain the clinical, educational, vocational and rehabilitation programs initiated by JRI. It therefore approved the proposed modifications, concluding that the Plan "appears to properly balance the competing goals of treatment and security and adequately protects the rights of the residents."

The court refused, however, to vacate the Decrees, as the Commonwealth requested, stating:

While the Plan details the provision of treatment and the ability of DOC to address security concerns, at bottom, the potential for conflict between these interests continues to exist. The confusing and conflicting roles of DMH and DOC have been resolved. It is DOC's sole responsibility to provide treatment in a secure setting. The Plan provides them with the rules to accomplish this. The Plan does not, and no plan can, provide the willingness and commitment in doing so.

Thus recognizing that only future performance would administer the Plan in harmony with the essence of the Decrees, the court denied the motion to vacate without prejudice to review it for one year; following that period, during which the court would monitor Plan implementation, it would reconsider the motion.

On appeal, appellants first level the general charge that DOC "has essentially turned the Treatment Center into a prison and fundamentally altered the therapeutic community." It is, of course, true that the added emphasis on security and safety, together with a new approach to behavior management, featuring definite sanctions for defined unacceptable behavior, will inevitably effect some retreat from a more permissive atmosphere. But appellants' sweeping condemnation cannot stand without more precise identification of serious defects in the many provisions regarding varieties of treatment, the extent of clinical supervision, and the safeguards of individual rights.

Appellants turn specifically to four areas. The first is CAP, where the participants have shrunk from fifty-six in 1988 to two in 1997. They also criticize the application process that must be completed by an patient/inmate before being accepted for release into the community. Under the Plan, the patient/inmate must initiate his own program proposal, then must face review with the prospect that, if once denied acceptance, he must begin again after a six month delay. Appellants also say that the Community Access Board should, under *Youngberg v. Romeo*, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), be entirely composed of clinicians.

The Plan devotes some forty-four pages to CAP. This has obviously been a subject of intense rethinking. Under a change in the statute, a resident is no longer eligible for participation if he is still serving a sentence; he must now have completed serving any criminal sentence. The introductory section observes that the prior policies did not adequately emphasize public safety and states, "Recent events and improvements in the understanding of both the dynamics of sexual offenses and the realistic objectives for treatment, as well as legislative change to Chapter 123A, have lead [sic] to the development of a revised program." The Plan adopts a cautious approach which recognizes that "sexually dangerous persons" will "never cease to be 'at risk.' "

Accordingly, whereas access to the community had earlier been approved prior to the designing of a program, careful, even meticulous, planning must now precede approval of access. The process of plan review and approval is indeed a daunting, attenuated one. But we cannot at this juncture rule the new program out of bounds. In this most sensitive area of tension between safety and treatment, and between the individual and the community, we cannot say that CAP is not the least restrictive feasible response.

The shrinkage in numbers of participants must be viewed against the background that a substantial number of residents, many of whom are serving very lengthy sentences, simply refuse to participate in or apply to treatment programs. Moreover, a JRI analysis*17 reveals that in 1996, three of the ninety-one eligible residents of a total population of 202 submitted applications and proposed plans. As of January 1997, two remained in the program while twelve resided in the less restrictive Community Transition House in a "pre-transition" program. This does not, in our opinion, point to any obvious constitutional failure. Further adjudication will have to await events.

As for the *Youngberg* argument that the entire Community Access Board should consist of clinicians, we refer to our discussion, *infra*, in relation to a similar criticism of decision making in the behavior management area.

Another area of specific criticism is the Transfer Board and its policies. The Transfer Board is a creation of Chapter 489, enacting a new section 2A of Chapter 123, which provides that a resident who is serving under an unexpired criminal sentence may be transferred from the Center to a

correctional institution. The factors that may be considered are "unamenability to treatment," "unwillingness to follow treatment recommendations, lack of progress in treatment, danger to other residents or staff, [and] security." Appellants say the policies fail to identify treatment and the criteria for "unamenability of treatment." They also contend that the Board is insufficiently clinical in composition, and that there are no criteria defining when a patient may be eligible for return to the Center.

We preface our consideration of appellants' contentions by recalling the basic rationale that prompted the new statutory provisions. As Dr. Schwartz explained in her affidavit, the earlier transfer provisions allowed transfer only for threat of harm or escape. She observed that some residents refuse treatment; they "cannot profit from treatment simply because of the length of their underlying sentences." Instead of these residents occupying limited places at the Center, it makes "far more sense" to allow "new and motivated admissions."

We find adequate assurances of treatment. In the first place, the Plan indicates that in placing a resident, the classification process will attempt to identify an institution where sex offender treatment is available. Additionally, the statute itself states that DOC "shall make available a program of voluntary treatment services." Finally, a member of the Center's treatment team will be liaison to prison staff. As for vagueness of "amenability" and "security," regulations have fleshed out the terms, the former being defined as failure to participate or make progress in six months and the latter as consisting of danger of physical harm to others manifested through threats or assaults.

With respect to appellants' claim that the criteria for return to the Center are undefined, we think that the Plan properly addresses the need for criteria. It specifically contemplates the establishment of guidelines, stating, "the Transfer Board will suggest minimum criteria for consideration of the resident's future return to the Treatment Center." The provision charges those persons responsible for transferring inmates to the Center-and therefore those persons most knowledgeable about the risks and responsibilities accompanying the return of inmates-with determining how best to accommodate the needs of the inmates, the Center and DOC.

We have also reviewed appellants' arguments that the transfer policies violated due process, double jeopardy and the ex post facto clause. The first claim is based on the assumption, which we have stated is unfounded, that suitable treatment will not be available to any transferred resident. The last claims rest on the assumption that a transferred resident will suffer a belated increase in his sentence. We find it unnecessary to elaborate on the district court's opinion resolving these issues as we are satisfied with the judge's analysis and conclusion that, on the record before him, there was no evidence of such increase.

With respect to clinical participation, the district court noted in its opinion that

The Commonwealth has agreed to modify the composition of the Board so that the Clinical Director of Treatment, the Deputy Superintendent of Programs and the Director of Security will be equally represented.... In other words, the decision *18 will be made by a vote of the professionals charged with the operation of the Treatment Center.

Appellants continue to assert that the only "professionals" who could fulfill the requirement of *Youngberg* are mental health professionals. We discuss this issue in the following paragraphs involving behavior management. Our conclusion is equally applicable to the Community Access Board and the Transfer Board.

An appropriate place to start our analysis of the behavior management component of the Plan is to examine appellants' criticism of the manner of imposing sanctions. We note that this criticism is levied at the Original Decree and is to be distinguished from the substance, punishment and sequestration, which are proscribed by the Supplemental Decree.

The controlling document, 103 MTC 430A, "Observation of Behavior Reports," sets forth the Center's disciplinary system, including a "clear set of rules" and a "clear set of sanctions." The monitoring and enforcing body is the Behavior Review Committee. Appointed by the Superintendent, it consists of one

security staff member, one clinician and one JRI staff member. This committee deals with violations meriting such sanctions as warnings, and room, unit, work, and visitation restrictions. In addition, the Superintendent has the authority to impose sequestration awaiting hearing, investigation, prosecution or a transfer hearing in instances where the resident has threatened, attempted, or inflicted serious harm on others.

Appellants contend that such decisions violate the teaching of *Youngberg* that only qualified professionals should make treatment decisions regarding involuntarily committed individuals. We begin by noting, as we did in *Cameron v. Tomez*, 990 F.2d 14 (1993), that *Youngberg* was a "cautiously phrased decision," directed to the right of a mentally retarded inmate to "minimally adequate ... training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint." *Id.* at 18 (citing *Youngberg*, 457 U.S. at 319, 102 S.Ct. 2452). Moreover, the Court in *Youngberg* gave a rather flexible, context-related definition of what it meant by "professional": "a person competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue." 457 U.S. at 323 n. 30, 102 S.Ct. 2452. It added the circumscribed caveat that "[l]ong-term treatment decisions normally should be made by persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training in such areas as psychology...." *Id.* Unlike in *Youngberg*, what is at issue here is not long term treatment decisions but short term disciplinary decisions. We look in our analysis to the guidance we deliberately gave, in *Cameron*, for the future application of the concept of professionals and to the role of administrators:

Any professional judgment that *decides* an issue involving conditions of confinement must embrace security and administration, and not merely medical judgments.... The administrators are responsible to the state and to the public for making professional judgments of their own, encompassing institutional concerns as well as individual welfare.

990 F.2d at 20.

In this case, the disciplinary system is responsive to both the "treatment" need of residents to learn accountability for their actions and the administrative and security concerns of the institution. The composition of the Behavior Review Committee, with one DMH professional, and one security-minded member from DOC, and one JRI person with overall treatment program responsibility seems well suited to the mix of concerns involved in sequestration decisions. Indeed, if mental health professionals were to control all decisions, certainty and regularity of sanction imposition would necessarily be swallowed up by ad hoc individualized decision making. We know of no case authority that would declare the decision process in applying sanctions described in the Plan facially constitutionally defective. We decline the invitation to extend *Youngberg* anticipatorily to this case.

The authority to sequester "awaiting action" wielded by the Superintendent implicates procedural concerns. The district court was sensitive to these concerns and required DOC to give the due process protections*19 of written notice of reasons for placement and opportunity to respond required by *Hewitt v. Helms*, 459 U.S. 460, 471, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), in cases of administrative segregation. The court, in so doing, acknowledged that its action stemmed from its recognition that residents, unlike the prison inmate in *Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), were entitled to due process protections. Again, on this record we are not prepared to declare any breach of procedural due process.

A final target of the criticism is in the area of resident management and operations. Appellants protest a number of privileges which have been truncated. These involve the amount of clothing allowed to be kept by a patient, the amount of funds, and the number of room visits, telephone calls, stamps, credit cards, etc. The Plan justifies some reduction in these privileges because of past experiences with security, assault, gambling, coercion, and interruptions in treatment. No reduction rises to the level of a constitutional infraction.

When all the smoke has cleared, the legislatively ordered change in command and the directions which it proposes to take do not exceed the reasonable latitude implicit in the legislative change of command. Nor does either appear likely to undermine the Original Decree or to violate the Constitution.

II. The Supplemental Decree.

A. Modification.

[9]  While modification of the Original Decree involved mainly a change from dual control to exclusive DOC management of the Center, the Supplemental Decree and any modifications proposed were substantive. The Supplemental Decree barred solitary confinement for punishment, "disciplinary and punitive procedures having no place in the care and treatment of civilly committed patients." The requested modifications would strike the general proscription of disciplinary and punishment procedures and link solitary confinement to the offense underlying the original commitment of the individual.

In *King II*, we were not persuaded that the mere change in control implicated this substantive change. We therefore remanded the question of justification for modification and left it to the district court to decide whether further factual development or opinion evidence was needed. The court decided that it did not require an evidentiary hearing and scheduled a prompt submission of briefs and a hearing for presentation of views. Appellants submitted several affidavits, and appellees rested on the record. The court ruled that a significant change in fact had occurred, based on examination of the Plan and monthly DOC reports which verified DOC's adherence to the Plan, a visit to the Center with counsel, discussion with the residents at the Center, and review of opinions of the qualified professional in charge of the administration of the Plan, Dr. Schwartz. The court also stated that the dramatically changed conditions of segregation that had taken place since 1972 constituted a relevant added factual development.

We agree with the district court but would add another factual development called for by our scrutiny of the record, namely, a significant change in the philosophical approach to treatment of civilly committed sex offenders in programs operated by correctional departments. We do not mean that there has been a complete reversal of position under all circumstances from the earlier, more permissive mental health approach to the more restrictive behavior control approach. But the monolithic acceptance of the mental health approach that existed a quarter of a century ago has yielded to the acknowledgment that there is no royal road to treatment and cure. Behavioral control programs including defined offenses and sanctions are now featured in institutions operated by corrections personnel.

We begin with the 1989 report of the Governor's Special Advisory Panel on Forensic Mental Health, which preceded the passage in 1994 of Chapter 489. We do not rely on opinions expressed by that Panel, but on some factual statements which have never been impugned. Indicative of some kind of sea change is that most of the thirty-one states that had "special dispositional provisions"*²⁰ for sex offenders, i.e., indefinite commitments as in Massachusetts, repealed or significantly reformed the statutes. Repeal was recommended by the American Bar Association in its 1984 proposed Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards on the ground that, *inter alia*, the assumption that mental disability underlay sexual offenses in general was no longer viewed as clinically valid. A 1977 report of the American Psychiatry Association to the same effect was cited.

Dr. Roger Smith, the impressively credentialed Director of Michigan's Bureau of Forensic Mental Health, narrowed the focus to programs run by correctional personnel. In 1994, he evaluated the Massachusetts DOC Plan. In an affidavit, he made the point that in institutions where civilly committed residents and corrections inmates are lodged and treated, "[E]very attempt must be made to apply program rules, and sanctions for violation of such rules, in a uniform and fair manner, and to avoid the perception (or reality) that civilly committed residents have privileges and rights which exceed those of their DOC peers." In states that have opted to treat sex offenders only in the months prior to parole release, he added, programs generally are provided in minimum security settings. As for DOC's Plan, "[t]he establishment of clear rules and sanctions for rule violations by residents is clearly long overdue, and essential to effective management of the therapeutic program." He also

found the restrictions on residents' privileges, such as visits and mail, to be "consistent with standards found in correctional treatment programs nationwide."

To this we add the unrebutted factual assertions of Dr. Schwartz, who is a JRI employee and the Clinical Director of the Center. Having trained staff from most of the prison-based sex offender treatment programs, she made the unqualified statement: "Every sex offender program in the country which is operated by a corrections department adheres to the disciplinary policy of the institution."

These affidavits were filed with the court in November 1994. Only after remand did appellants seek to counter such statements in any way. In 1997, appellants filed affidavits of clinical directors of treatment programs in Kansas and Washington. These programs were run by a department of Social and Rehabilitation Services or of Social and Health Services and were available only to persons soon to finish serving their sentences or without criminal sentences, whose release depended solely on their ability to control their conduct. It is understandable that in Kansas sequestration for a period in excess of fifty-nine minutes was rare, and that in Washington there had been only one occasion in thirteen months to keep an inmate in a "quiet room" for up to four hours. Clearly, the populations and the problems were quite different from those in the Center. Appellants also submitted a draft of a proposed patients' handbook from Wisconsin, but although some twenty-two definitions of "major misconduct" were set forth, the Appendix we were furnished did not contain standards for either incapacitation measures or deterrent sanctions. The program, unlike that we consider here, was confined to those who were only civilly committed. We view appellants' submissions concerning other states' civil-commitments-only programs as essentially comparing oranges to appellees' apples.

Finally, appellants attempt to demonstrate that there has been no change in basic treatment philosophy by submitting a 1972 policy statement by Dr. Harry Kozol, then Director of the Center, who did not attribute his policy eschewing punishment to a mental illness theory but rather to a view of self-discipline and personal accountability as focal patient goals. Any similarity with the present treatment philosophy stops at this point. For Dr. Kozol went on to describe the process of enforcing accountability: when a patient was found to have engaged in "antisocial and inappropriate behavior," a clinical study would be made of steps needed to be taken, which could include, not segregation, but "exclusion from the population and placement in the Special Intensive Treatment Unit." This was, he stated, not looked upon as "lock-up" but, "[i]n operation, this program has excluded patients from the general population for considerably longer periods than patients ... were excluded in lock-up by the correctional authority here." *21 We think it clear that this system-lacking definitions of "antisocial and inappropriate behavior," and with sanctions that vary according to the clinical analysis, indeterminate sequestration, and release that depends on "our clinical judgment that the risk of his acting offensively and inappropriately is reduced to a reasonable or substantial [sic] level"-differs significantly from the Plan's approach.

The factual assertions of the Special Advisory Panel and Dr. Schwartz, together with the observations of Michigan's Dr. Smith, lead us to accept as a significant change of fact the adoption of a new treatment approach to sex offender treatment programs conducted by corrections departments. Our survey of this record also convinces us that the court did not err in not delaying its consideration pending further discovery. Appellants' request in their Joint Submission Concerning Supplemental Decree was couched in the alternative. In the event that the court did not deny the motion to modify the Supplemental Decree, they wished discovery, citing as their only objective, "the deposition of defendants' witnesses." What we said in connection with the refusal to extend discovery relating to the Original Decree applies here. We see little fruitful prospect in such proceedings; the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing such a request.

The district court suitably relied on the Plan, its visit to the Center, its talks with residents who did not complain about discipline, punishment, or conditions in the Minimum Privilege Unit, and on the opinion of Dr. Schwartz who averred, "I consider the institution of a disciplinary policy containing clearly defined offenses carrying definitive sanctions as an essential part of a state-of-the-art treatment program." The court added that since punishment was clearly contemplated, "it follows that appropriate punishment may include sequestration of some kind." This last proposition may not be self evident. We therefore elaborate.

A reading of the Code of Offenses and list of sanctions suggests to us the essentiality of sequestration to this Plan. There are fifty-nine offenses divided among four categories. There are eleven offenses described in the category of the greatest severity, such as killing, rape, arson, and taking hostages. In the high category are seventeen offenses, including assault, bringing in illegal drugs, demanding protection money, and counterfeiting. The nineteen offenses in the moderate category include refusing a direct order, lying to a staff member, and threatening another person. The low category consists of twelve offenses, ranging from use of obscene language and unexcused absences, to failure to follow safety regulations.

In like manner, the sanctions vary both according to category and to whether the offense is accompanied by mitigating or aggravating circumstances-or neither. The most severe sanction is placement in the Minimum Privilege Unit for thirty days for a severe offense accompanied by aggravating circumstances. Other sanctions available for severe offenses include loss of privileges from sixty to eighty days, restitution, forfeiture of good time, restitution, and loss of job. The maximum sanction for a high offense, with aggravating circumstances, is placement in the Minimum Privilege Unit for five days with a lesser alternative being room restriction for ten days, and, like a severe offense, restitution, loss of privileges, good time, and job.

It is obvious that, if placement in the Minimum Privilege Unit were not available as a sanction, the range of sanctions would be so telescoped and compressed that a resident could not expect much more severe treatment for a high or severe offense than for a moderate offense. For example, a resident who had taken hostages might lose some privileges for eighty days while a resident who refused an order might lose some privileges for five days. The disparity between offenses far exceeds the disparity in sanctions that could be imposed. We therefore also conclude that sequestration is an integral part of the Plan's system of graduated and defined offenses and sanctions.

Finally, we cannot fault the court for relying on the "vastly different" conditions of confinement in the Minimum Privilege Unit today compared to those described in the *King* complaint. King, placed in solitary *22 confinement without procedural safeguards for calling a guard a "dingbat," was placed in a six by nine foot cell, without a sink, only a portable chamber pot, no facilities for drinking water, no reading or writing materials, no visits-not even from his parents-no radio or exercise ... and filthy walls and floor.

The Minimum Privilege Unit, on the other hand, is a new building constructed in 1986, with rooms eight by sixteen feet, with toilet and sink. Residents are allowed access to telephone, visitors, exercise periods, daily showers, canteen, and library. The regulations, 103 MTC 423.07, provide that residents in the Minimum Privilege Unit will be accorded treatment by their regular treatment team, unless some modification is dictated by safety and security. Additional or supplemental treatment "will be provided as necessary."

We are fully satisfied that this combination of a difference in basic approaches, a detailed Plan maintaining treatment standards accompanied by a detailed disciplinary system, and dramatic changes in conditions of confinement amounts to the significant change in facts required by *Rufo*.

As for the second prong, "suitable tailoring," there is little need for lengthy discussion. The Plan preserves clinical treatment programs and procedural safeguards. Its departures from the Supplemental Decree, inaugurating a disciplinary system and outlining procedures for charging, deciding, and reviewing infractions seem well within reasonable requirements. The major area of difference, the Plan's provision for sequestration, reveals a restrained resort to this sanction. Placement in the Minimum Privilege Unit is allowed under only four circumstances: commission of a severe offense with aggravating circumstances (up to thirty days); a severe offense without either aggravating or mitigating circumstances (up to twenty days); a severe offense under mitigating circumstances (up to ten days); and a high offense under aggravating circumstances (up to five days). The only other kind of confinement is restriction to one's room, which can be imposed for ordinary and aggravated high offenses for seven and ten days, and for an aggravated moderate offense for five days.

Given the legitimacy of a disciplinary system in a treatment program under the auspices of a

department of correction, such utilization of sequestration fulfills the requirement of being suitably tailored to the change of circumstances. We find that modification of the Supplemental Decree is therefore justified.

* * *

We note only briefly an issue that our decision has mooted-whether or not the district court erred in vacating several orders of Judge Young. These orders all dealt with participation of psychologists or psychiatrists in various kinds of decision and policy making in the use of sequestration. Our holding that the proposed modifications in the Supplemental Decree as illustrated by the Plan are both based on significant changes in fact and are tailored to those changes leaves no room for the continued survival of Judge Young's orders, which served as interim measures pending a long-term resolution.

We have considered the other arguments advanced by appellants, intervenor plaintiffs, and amicus and deem them either to raise issues not presented to the district court or otherwise without merit.

At this point we can only say that court and counsel have done their jobs well in what must be one of the most complex and vexing areas of law and administration. What we have said in upholding modifications of the Decrees concerning DOC's Plan should not be construed as rulings foreclosing issues arising out of Plan administration in the future. What we have done is to survey the new regime, its general approach, and to give a green light. That does not mean that reckless driving will be immune from review. We rely on the district court, which has commendably shown its readiness to exercise its oversight powers.

Affirmed.

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 - [97-1021](#) (Docket) (Jan. 08, 1997)
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Att #3 1-10-07

**NORTH DAKOTA COUNCIL ON ABUSED WOMEN'S SERVICES
COALITION AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT IN NORTH DAKOTA**

418 East Rosser #320 • Bismarck, ND 58501 • Phone: (701) 255-6240 • Fax 255-1904 • Toll Free 1-888-255-6240 • ndcaws@ndcaws.org

Senator Dave Nething, Chair
Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee
January 10, 2007
Testimony in support of SB 2136

My name is Jessica McSparron-Bien, Sexual Assault Program and Policy Coordinator with the ND Council on Abused Women's Services/Coalition Against Sexual Assault in ND. I am here to provide testimony in support of SB 2136.

One thing this bill will allow for is sexual assault victims to have access to prompt information about custodial release of sex offenders from civil commitment, through the Victim-Witness Coordinator Program in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. This right is guaranteed in the Fair Treatment of Victims and Witnesses within the NDCC 12.1-34. Currently however, the sex offender civil commitment program is in the Department of Human Services and this information is limited by confidentiality statutes on medical information. This change allows victims to know when their offender is released from custody and will give the victim the opportunity to learn about the Sex Offender Registration website and where to continue to look for information about their offender after release from custody. We support this bill as it allows victims access to information that is critical to their safety. We ask that you support this bill also.

Thank you.

Testimony Prepared for Senate Bill 2136
House Human Services
February 27, 2007

Madam Chairperson, members of the committee, for the record my name is Ryan Bernstein, and I am the legal counsel for the Governor.

I am here to explain the genesis of SB 2136 and to offer an amendment to the bill in its current form.

This bill was originally introduced by the Department of Human Services in cooperation with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The original bill transferred the civilly committed sexual offenders program from the Department of Human Services to the Department of Corrections. The reason for this bill was to help improve safety and security for the community and the employees working at the civil commitment unit because the individuals that are now being committed are more violent than ever before. We felt the complete transfer of the program was the right plan.

However, the Senate Judiciary had concerns about the constitutionality of the transfer. The committee amended the bill to the current version. To help ensure the safety of those that work in the civil commitment division and the community, the departments pledged to work together to develop the best plan they could within the confines of the Senate Judiciary amendment.

The bill in its current form states in Section #1 that the Department of Human Service and the Department of Corrections shall enter into an interagency agreement, which would have the Department of Corrections help with the provision and enforcement of safety and security at the facilities while the Department of Human Services continues to provide the

treatment. Section 2 states the departments must report to the legislative council on the interagency department.

At this time I would like to propose the amendment that I have prepared. This removes the words "is responsible for" from line 10 and replaces it with "must train, consult, and assist the department of human services with." We feel this language would enable the departments to work more effectively together. Provisions of the interagency agreement will provide that the Department of Human Services consult with the Department of Corrections on the remodeling of the facilities and that the Department of Corrections will help train Department of Human Services' staff in safety protocol. They will also be available in the case of an emergency.

Also, the amendment more clearly defines the practices at the facility under the standard known as JCAHO. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospital Organizations requires that all contracted staff in a JCAHO accredited facility follow their standards. JCAHO standards outline the distinction between administrative and clinical seclusion and/or restraint. Because all contract staff must abide by the standards, the clearest distinction on roles would be to have the Department of Human Services staff be responsible for conducting the activities. This way there is no confusion on whether JCAHO standards apply to Correction staff in addition to Human Services staff working in the same building.

Madam Chairperson, members of the committee, I hope you adopt the amendment to this bill and then vote due pass.

Thank you.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SENATE BILL 2136

Page 1, line 10, delete "is responsible for" and insert "must train, consult, and assist the department of human services with"