

**House Bill 1368**  
**North Dakota Retirement and Investment Office (RIO)**  
**Testimony in opposition to HB 1368 before the House Industry, Business, and**  
**Labor Committee**  
**Representative Scott Louser, Chair**  
**Representative Mitch Ostlie, Vice Chair**

**Janilyn Murtha, JD, MPAP – Executive Director**  
**Scott Anderson, CFA, MBA – Chief Investment Officer**

**I. Introduction**

The Retirement and Investment Office (hereinafter “RIO”) was created by the 1989 Legislative Assembly to capture administrative and investment cost savings in the management of the investment program of the State Investment Board (SIB) and the retirement program of the Teachers’ Fund for Retirement (TFFR). Statutory authority for the agency is found in North Dakota Century Code chapter 54-52.5 and the programs are governed by chapters 21-10 (SIB) and 15-39.1 (TFFR).

The State Investment Board has the statutory responsibility to administer the investment program for 28 funds including the Legacy Fund, TFFR, PERS, and WSI. It also maintains contractual relationships for the investment management of multiple political subdivisions and governmental funds. Currently SIB is responsible for the investment of the Legacy Fund, seven pension funds and 20 other non-pension funds for a total of 28 separate client funds with assets under management (AUM) of roughly \$18 billion as of October 31, 2022.

This AUM has grown from about \$4 billion in 2010 and continue to grow from investment returns and contributions to the Legacy Fund, pension plans, and insurance funds. The combination of the growth of AUM, the number of individually managed funds, and the complexity of mandates such as the Legacy Fund have increased the need for staff resources, infrastructure and new scalable investment processes that can enhance the performance of client funds while reducing the net cost of management of those funds when manager fees are considered.

Currently, the SIB relies entirely on an external investment manager structure; ie RIO does not have internal investment management authority or operations. RIO contracts with over forty investment managers, vendors, and consultants in the administration of our two programs.

**II. Opposition to HB 1368**

Opposition to HB 1368 should in no way be construed as opposition to prohibiting commercial activities or investment activities with Israel. On the contrary, RIO implements business practices that would not restrict any investment or business activities with Israel for non-pecuniary reasons. The investment program as a matter of policy and in compliance with North Dakota law as set forth under NDCC Ch. 21-10, only invests for the exclusive benefit of its beneficiaries in a way that seeks to maximize return for a given level of risk. Any restriction of its investment or

commercial set of opportunities for non-pecuniary reasons such as restricting investment in Israel is already prohibited by policy and law.

Our concerns relate to the potential conflict this bill may create with other existing or future legislation, or mandated business practices, the cost and complexity of implementing the bill, and the potential that the bill may unintentionally reduce commercial opportunities even with vendors who support Israel because of the cost the bill imposes on the vendor.

The vast majority of RIO's vendor's conduct business in many if not all states, and the regulation and oversight of these vendors is largely concurrent between state and federal regulatory systems, especially within the securities industry. Uniformity among regulatory requirements is therefore a critical issue for both the vendors and for government entities attempting to procure their services. The proposal, though well intentioned, would impose non-uniform conduct requirements on our vendors and require a level of administration from RIO that may be infeasible to implement. The proposal requires that RIO not only negotiate additional contract provisions with every vendor but also monitor the public statements and private contracts that the vendor may engage in with other clients or providers that have no direct business with RIO or the State of North Dakota. It would be infeasible for RIO to monitor public statements of vendors without a significant increase in compliance personnel and cost; and infeasible for RIO to access information related to the private contracts or dealings the vendor may engage in with other private third parties. In the event that outside vendors are unable or unwilling to work with RIO due to these additional requirements RIO would need to internalize functions that are currently contracted out, significantly increasing costs for the agency.

### **III. Summary**

Pursuant to both North Dakota law and SIB policy, RIO implements business practices that would not restrict any investment or business activities with Israel for non-pecuniary reasons. The proposal, though well intentioned, may be infeasible to administer and significantly increase the cost and resources needed to perform compliance monitoring as well as have the unintended consequence of requiring the agency to internalize many functions that are currently performed by external partners. An additional consequence of impairment to contracting with third parties and a subsequent need to internalize operations at a speed beyond our current phased proposal would have a detrimental impact to the investment program and client fund earnings.